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Closing the Divide - Issues When Developing a Bond Market: 







Since the Asian economic crisis of the late 1990s, many countries in the region are 
embarking on programs to develop their financial systems to minimise or prevent such an 
incident in the future.  This paper looks at Sri Lanka as an example of an underdeveloped 
bond market and its progress to date in reducing the divide.  Comparisons and advice can be 
sought from developed economies, however the implementation of a progressive financial 
structure is unique to a country's own environment.  In this instance the civil conflict and 
lingering cultural idiosyncrasies are impediments to progress. 
 
 






    




Closing the Divide - Issues When Developing a Bond Market: 
The Case of Sri Lanka 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Benefits of a vibrant and effective bond market in government securities with a wide variety 
of maturities includes the ability to set a benchmark for risk free interest rates and also to set 
a benchmark for corporate bond rates (Emery, 1997; International Finance Corporation, 
2000; Herring and Chatusripitak, 2000; Yoshitomi and Shirai, 2000), and that a well 
functioning bond market will help overcome the mismatched financing of long-term 
projects by short-term loans (Asian Development Bank Institute, 2000a).  Figure 1 provides 
an overview of the current position, processes required for development and future 
positions.  The lack of relevant and reliable information impedes confidence in financial 
markets. 
 
<insert Figure 1 about here> 
 
 
Hakansson (1999) claims that the presence of a strong corporate bond market has a 
strong positive effect on an economy as it reduces the domination of banks in corporate 
lending. Reasons for a lower private sector bond issuance in Asia is attributed to poor credit 
ratings, which makes investment less attractive. Disadvantages of developing corporate 
bond markets in Asian economies are that it can take a long time, as demonstrated by many 
countries, and secondly, that the disclosure requirements applied to corporate bond issuers 
are considerably more strict than those applied to banks (Asian Development Bank Institute, 
2000b). 
Since the Asian financial crises in the late 1990s, effected economies have taken 
necessary steps to improve financing options including improving the bond markets as an 
alternative source of finance to traditional equity financing or bank financing.  An economy 
can grow rapidly without an active bond market, but the cost is an increased vulnerability to 
a financial crisis and a loss of information to guide savings and investment decisions 
(Herring and Chatusripitak, 2000).  Heavy reliance on banks means a correspondingly 
heavy exposure to banking crises and without other financing sources banks tend to 
dominate.  Khan and Senhadji (2000) found a strong positive relationship between financial 
depth and growth which suggests that improved financing options will also help an 
economy to grow stronger. 
International Finance Corporation (2000) suggest that emerging market economies 
should look at the experiences of other emerging market economies for guidance on what 
works in particular conditions.  The Sri Lankan government has been studying the bond 
market in South Korea and Thailand (Jayawardena, 1999).  The development of corporate 
bond markets are relatively new for emerging economies and therefore experiences are 
limited.  Emerging market countries need to find ways to manage the risks, and hence 
benefit from international capital flows.  Local-currency bonds can help dampen the effects    
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of crises created by international capital flows by locking in interest rates and local-currency 
funding.  Borrowers can then hold onto their funds and work their way through a crisis.  
The fixed income market for Sri Lanka is approximately 9% of GDP as compared to 
Singapore 68%, South Korea 51%, India 32%, Thailand 12% and Indonesia 15% (Königson 
and Nystrand, 1999).  In fact, the only other country in the region with a similar level of 
market participation is China.   
The main objective of the present study is to investigate the Sri Lankan bond market 
as an example of a small under-developed bond market and its progress to date in becoming 
more developed. The paper is organised as follows.  This section provides an introduction to 
the Sri Lankan debt market, and looks at the reasons for developing a bond market. Section 
3 analyses the size of the market and suggest some reasons for the lack of development.  
Section 4 concludes the paper and provides some recommendations to improve the bond 
market infrastructure in Sri Lanka. 
 
2.  Sri Lanka Debt Markets 
Government Bonds 
There is an active trade in government securities in both the primary and secondary 
markets and they dominate the bond market in Sri Lanka .The lack of a benchmark for 
government bonds has slowed development of the local debt market.  The bond program for 
2000 was set at around 80 billion rupees (compared with LKR63.4 billion in 1999).  Bonds 
of up to 10 years have recently been issued in an attempt to help set a yield curve.  A 
sustainable supply of government bonds is required whilst still balancing bonds outstanding 
and keeping fiscal discipline.  Total government debt at the end of 1998 was Rs. 924,699 
(million) or approximately US$14,226 (million) with Rs. 463,426 (million)  as domestic 
debt and Rs.461,273 (million) as foreign debt.  Total debt as a percentage of GDP was 89.4 
for 1998. The outstanding government debt at end October 2000 stood at Rs. 1,167.5 billion 
consisting of Rs.643.8 billion (55%) of domestic debt and Rs.523.7 billion (45%) of foreign 
debt (US$6.8 bn).   
There is an interest rate price/risk anomaly between government securities and bank 
investments.  The reason for this is due to the fact that two major banks owned 
predominantly by the government invest heavily in Treasury Bills and Bonds using funds 
received from bank deposits.  Until the investor base is broadened to increase competition 
this phenomena will remain.  The allocation of financial capital at prices that reflect the 
riskiness of an investment i s at the heart of healthy, sustainable economic development 
(Asian Development Bank Institute, 2000c). 
The Sri Lankan government planned a $150m to $200m major international bond 
issue to form the beginnings of a full yield curve for the country.  Having hoped to set a 
sovereign benchmark since the beginning of 1998, the government has, however pulled 
back from advancing its ambition in the face of a deteriorating market.  The government 
was first forced to put its plans on hold in May 1998 when nuclear testing by India and 
Pakistan blew spreads on issues from the sub-continent wide open.   
Medium-term bonds starting from three-year maturities are usually subscribed by 
state-managed companies, which bid at lower levels to reduce the cost of borrowing.  As a 
result, corporations often play a passive role in the bond market.  It is expected that as 
interest rates fall, more corporations will enter the bond market.  In 1999 the government 
introduced 5-and 6- year bonds for the first time as part of efforts to extend maturities and    
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develop the debt market.  Companies are expected to issue more debt into the local market 
as Duff and Phelps Credit Rating Agency Lanka assign more ratings to local companies. 
 
Treasury Bills 
The recurrent budget deficit of the government has necessitated the continuous issue 
of new treasury bills while reissuing the maturing bills.  The first Treasury Bill was issued 
in 1923 but regular issues did not occur until 1941.  The primary issue of treasury bills is 
made by auction by the Public Debt Department of the CBSL.  Tenders are called for 
through Notices placed in national newspapers from primary dealers.  Although the process 
is called an auction the Central Bank decides how much to accept after offers have been 
made which is sometimes above the limit set on offer.  From October 20, 1999 the CBSL of 
Sri Lanka issued Treasury Bills with maturities of 91 days, 182 days and 364 days in place 
of Treasury Bills with 3 month, 6 month and 12-month maturities to introduce conformity 
with market practices (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 1999).  Treasury Bills are issued under 
the provisions of Local Treasury Bills Ordinance No. 8 of 1923 as amended by Act No. 35 
of 1953, Act No. 35 of 1992 and Act No. 31 of 1995.   
 
Treasury Bond Market 
Treasury bonds were first issued in 1997 under the provisions of Registered Stock 
and Securities Ordinance No. 7 of 1937.  Treasury bonds with maturities of 2, 3 and 4 years 
were issued in 1997.  The government has had a favourable response to longer-term bonds 
and in 2000 issued 4, 5 and 6-year bonds.  Given the sharp increase in interest rates in early 
2001, a decision was made to drop the maximum maturity to 2 years until rates again 
become more favourable. Recent prominent achievements included the development of a 
long-term debt market by increasing Treasury bond issues and mobilizing resources in the 
international debt market.  In this regard, the Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon, 
one of Sri Lanka's two development finance organizations (which are largely  private sector 
institutions), issued a $65 million ten-year floating rate note at LIBOR plus 2 percent.  The 
first ever auctioning of a 6-year Treasury bond occurred in September 1999. 
 
Rupee Loans 
Since 1998 the government has continued to move away from nonmarketable rupee 
securities.  Approximately LKR 27.1 billion was allocated as rupee loans for 2000, 
compared with LKR 23 billion in 1999 and about LKR 56 billion of rupee securities in 
1998. Rupee loans are issued on a long-term basis up to 30 years, but in practice the 
maturities are generally 2 - 10 years.  The loans are floated on the basis of the governments 
financing requirements.  They are transferable by registration with the Registrar of Public 
Debts and therefore they are not marketable instruments.  They are the largest component of 
government debt and are almost exclusively owned by public institutions (95.4% as at 
August 1999) such as NSB, Employees' Provident Fund and Employees' Trust Fund.  
Private investors have not taken them up because the interest rate is generally lower than 
market rates, there is no secondary market, have a long term maturity and high volatility.  
Rupee loans are generally non-negotiable and the amount outstanding is approximately 50% 
of treasury bonds.     




Primary dealers were first introduced in 1992 with 18 dealers.  CBSL appointed 8 
dedicated primary dealers with effect from 1 March 2000 under the new Local Treasury 
Bills (Primary Dealers Regulation No. 1 of 2000) that leaves out foreign banks and a few 
non-banking financial institutions.  Primary dealers are required to form a public limited 
liability company with a minimum capital of Rs. 150million.  The capital requirements are 
expected to increase to Rs. 200million by 2000 and Rs. 500million by 2003.  
 
Corporate Bonds 
The issuance of corporate bonds to the general public began in 1996 and since then 10 
companies have risen about Rs. 6.7 billion (US$354 million) by 1999.  There is a primary 
and secondary market for corporate bonds in Sri Lanka.  The f ees associated with the 
issuance of bonds include the coupon rate, cost of issuance (0.4%), annual bank guarantee 
fee 1.5% and taxes.  Most corporate bonds are bank guaranteed. Corporate bonds have had 
their yields based on the risk free Treasury Bill and Bond rates, and then taking into account 
the credit risk associated with the instrument.  The yields on commercial paper, which are 
unsecured promissory notes issued by companies to raise short-term funds, varied within a 
range of 12.00-18.00 per cent in the first half of 2000, in comparison to the range of 11.50-
18.00 per cent in 1999.  There were up to 11 issues of corporate bonds in 1998 due mainly 
to the banks covering their capital adequacy requirements.  Banks and financial institutions 
have undertaken most issues. 
   
3.  Analysis  
The total size of the market as at mid 1999 was approximately LKR 77 billion 
(USD$1.06 billion).  In January 2001, there were only 2 US denominated (Eurobonds) 
bonds listed  - the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and  the other by 
Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon (DFCC) with a 10 year maturity.  The average 
maturity is increasing over time as the government attempts to build a yield curve. 
The overall fixed income market for Sri Lanka is 9% of GDP which is extremely 
low when compared to Korea 52%, Thailand 12% and Hong Kong 29%. The dominance of 
the banking sector is illustrated with provision of domestic bank credit at 72.7% of GDP, 
the stock market capitalization at only 29.8% of GDP and the total fixed income market at 
only 9% of GDP.  The stock market is underdeveloped as borrowers have generally used 
finance companies. 
 Jayawardena (1999), the Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, suggests that 
impediments to bond market development and hence possible reasons for its small size are: 
the laws, the conventions, the customs, the culture, and other attitudes to public and private 
sector development.  Problems remain in getting the public and private sector to talk with 
one another which again follows on from the socialistic period.  Also financial analysts in 
the market have little understanding of the markets.  This could be because of the size and 
hence lack of experience and that talented financial analysts leave the country for more 
lucrative careers elsewhere.  Additionally, with the lack of freedom of the press, generally 
only facts are reported and not necessarily opinions.  This may stem from cultural aspects as 
well.    
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La Porta et. al. (1997) show that countries with poor investor protections have 
significantly smaller debt and equity markets and that religious traditions such as Hindu or 
Muslim law appear to be less relevant in matters of investor protection.  The law for Sri 
Lanka is adequate for investor protection but the enforcement may be a problem due inpart 
to the fact that corruption is still prevalent.  Countries develop substitute mechanisms for 
poor investor protection.  Some mechanisms are statutory, whilst another adaptive response 
is ownership concentration.  Common law countries the average is 43%.  In the case of Sri 
Lanka the concentration is extreme with the top three shareholders owning on average 60% 
of the company (Table 1).  This concentration of ownership may be a reflection of poor 
investor protection suggesting inadequate corporate governance.    
 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
 
In Panel B of Table 1, the level of market capitalization is shown.  The average market 
capitalization for the top 10 Sri Lankan listed firms is only US$4 million which is 
insignificant in comparison to all other listed countries and again illustrates the 
underdevelopment of the stock market.  The underdevelopment of the bond market is due to 
many factors apart from supporting infrastructure  - lack of corporate governance ie. 
adequate investor protection, overriding domination of the state owned entities, lingering 
socialist attitudes of the people in a supposedly market free environment, lack of 
development of the economy (especially the stock market), brain drain leaving the country, 
corruption, civil conflict, an inadequate number of accountants and enforcement of 
accounting standards.  Also restriction of the press to comment on government actions does 
not hold them accountable. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
To create the necessary infrastructure for a corporate bond market certain conditions 
must apply.  A genuine corporate bond market should be free from government interference 
so that investors can make decisions on economic criteria alone (Hakansson, 1998).  
Currently in Sri Lanka, this is not the case.  Most corporate bonds are backed by the 
government which means that it is questionable whether they are in fact 'corporate' bonds.  
The credit rating agency should help to overcome the lack of confidence that investors have 
in the market but to date has only issued a rating for Sri Lanka Telecom issues.  Another 
element required for a well-functioning bond market is a relevant and reliable financial 
reporting system.  As previously discussed it was only since 1998 that companies were 
required to follow accounting standards which are now the International Accounting 
Standards.  Still with corruption prevalent in the country and limited number of accountants, 
it is questionable how reliable the financial reports will be.  Another element required is 
financial analysts that can supply independent advice to investors.   
Boyagoda (2000) has proposed that the authorities should set up a robust clearing 
and settlement system (with the possibility of using the Colombo Stock Exchange's central 
depository system) and a screen based system to facilitate transparency of the bids/offers 
quoted by the dealers and order matching system.  Boyagoda also recommends government 
commitment in the following areas:  a) facilitating the development of the secondary market 
infrastructure and efficient regulatory framework; b) strengthening the intermediaries such 
as Primary Dealers to enable them to compete with retail commercial bank network by    
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providing access to adequate resources and increasing the public awareness of the 
government securities; c) continued commitment for financial sector reforms towards 
broad-basing the market participation and ensuring their independent decision making and 
thereby avoiding market distortions created due to the impact of captive sources.  
In 1983 the CBSL owned 99% of the Treasury Bills but by June 1999, 88.4% were 
owned by commercial banks and the non-bank sector.  Given that the government still has 
large stakes in the commercial banks, pension funds and insurance companies the 
government still indirectly owns a large proportion of government debt.  Without the 
complete privatisation of large sectors of the economy it is difficult to see how the bond 
markets and economy can move forward with any speed as people still expect to be able to 
fall back on the government for support.   
Even given the small size, the progress made towards developing a corporate bond 
market and a stronger government debt market are commendable. They have issued some 
longer-term maturity bonds to try to extend the benchmark yield curve, approved a debt-
rating agency and are also improving supporting infrastructure and settlement systems.  
Without outside support and assistance by the International Finance Corporation, an arm of 
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, the Sri Lankan program would not 
otherwise be as well developed.  The move to a market-based economy is slow and dogged 
by past socialistic expectations of the government.  The dominance of the government 
remains in so many prominent financial institutions.  The lack of corporate governance, 
poor accounting enforcement, the civil conflict and prevalence of corruption even given the 
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Table 1  Ownership of 10 Largest Nonfinancial Domestic Firms by Large 
Shareholders 
Panel A  Ownership by Three Largest 
Shareholders 
Country  Mean  Median 
Australia  .28  .28 
United States  .20  .12 
India  .40  .43 
Indonesia  .58  .62 
South Korea  .23  .20 
Pakistan  .37  .41 
Philippines  .57  .51 
Sri Lanka  .60  .61 
Thailand  .47  .48 
Common-law average  .43  .42 
     
Country   (Panel B)  Average Market Capitalization of 
Firms (Millions of U.S.$) 
Australia  5,943 
United States  71,650 
India  1,721 
Indonesia  882 
South Korea  1,034 
Pakistan  49 
Philippines  156 
Sri Lanka  4 
Thailand  996 
Common-law average  6,586 
Source:  La Porta et.al. (1998), Table 7           11 
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including poor enforcement 
accounting standards 
•  macroeconomic instability 
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government bonds 
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Larger, well developed 
market 